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Abstract
This article studies the emergence of Share&Charge, a German platform that organizes the sharing
of charging stations for electric vehicles (EVs) and the billing for the energy transactions.
Share&Charge follows a peer-to-peer fashion, enabling direct transactions between charging
station owners and EV drivers. On the demand side, the platform, with its interactive map, makes it
possible for EV owners to find a charging station in the most suitable location, for instance, at their
place of work or where they live. On the offer side, Share&Charge enables station operators
(private individuals or companies) to rent their charging stations and eventually to sell the elec-
tricity they produce. Charging tariffs within the charging station network are determined by the
charging station operators themselves, but the platform provides indicative tariffs. Launched in
September 2017, Share&Charge follows other initiatives, such as the French platforms Wattpop
and ChargeMap, and the Swedish Elbnb. Share&Charge’s network is already proven to be suc-
cessful with German citizens.
Share&Charge adds certain elements of value at different stages of EV utilization. First, this
model allows for a co-financing of charging infrastructures by individuals and businesses in the
private sector by sharing the infrastructure costs among EV drivers. Besides the purchase price of
EVs, the implementation of charging infrastructures and their financing represent a significant
barrier to the rise of e-mobility. Share&Charge helps remove this obstacle without adding a further
burden on the governmental budget. In addition, this approach follows the ‘‘user pays principle,’’
which engages in fair and effective financing. Second, the platform increases decentralized pro-
duction value and facilitates its expansion. It also helps in avoiding grid congestion and energy loss,
as well as increasing flexibility within the electricity market. Third, data use enables the optimi-
zation of energy demand and supply, and the optimal determination of tariffs, although these
remain facultative. Models like Share&Charge could thus positively impact energy policy by tackling
several upcoming obstacles associated with the development of EVs and decentralized energy
production capacities. However, new forms of network structures (decentralized networks,
sharing economy) and new actors (prosumers, platforms, etc.) also raise regulatory challenges.
This article presents some of the legal issues associated with the development of models like
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Share&Charge. In particular, we study the tax framework applicable to this model, assuming that as
such, it would be introduced into the Belgian market.
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Introduction
Electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure is a central aspect of e-mobility deployment. Without a
sufficient number of charging stations, consumer appeal for EVs remains low. The German platform
Share&Charge offers an innovative solution to this problem by allowing the sharing of EV charging
stations and enabling direct transactions between charging station owners and EV drivers in a peer-
to-peer fashion.1 Launched in September 2017, Share&Charge follows other initiatives such as the
French platforms Wattpop and ChargeMap and the Swedish Elbnb. Share&Charge’s network is
proven to be successful with German citizens, with more than 1200 charging stations currently in
Germany. Relying on new technological developments, Share&Charge lies at the crossroads of the
electricity market, the transport market, and digitalization. Although this model creates new oppor-
tunities for sustainable mobility, it also presents specific features, involving new actors (platform and
prosumers) and new structures (decentralized networks, microgrid networks, and sharing economy),
that disrupt existing frameworks and bring new regulatory challenges.
This article intends to examine some of the legal issues associated with the development of
platforms like Share&Charge. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the taxable person, taxable
income, supply of goods and services, and of the electricity supplier, as enshrined in Belgian
domestic law and in European law. Based on this background, the article reviews the tax frame-
work that would be applicable to the Share&Charge model, assuming that such a scheme would be
introduced into the Belgian market. The first part briefly presents the functioning of Share&Charge
and its potential benefits for EVs scale-up, as well as for the deployment of decentralized elec-
tricity production. The second part is dedicated to the tax treatment of operations involved in the
use of the platform. Finally, we conclude with several policy recommendations, in order to propose
a number of modifications to the existing legal system in order to foster models like
Share&Charge.
Part I—Presentation of Share&Charge: Functioning and benefits
The first part of this article firstly presents the functioning of Share&Charge (see section ‘‘Func-
tioning’’). It describes the actors (or legal entities) involved in this model and specifies the
demand- and offer-side’s main elements, based on the terms and conditions of use of the platform.2
In a second step, the benefits of Share&Charge on the deployment of EVs and on the development
of decentralized electricity are emphasized (see section ‘‘Benefits’’).
1. More information regarding the platform can be found at: https://shareandcharge.com (accessed August 2, 2018).
2. These are available at https://shareandcharge.com/en/app-terms/ (accessed August 2, 2018).
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Functioning
According to the terms and conditions of Share&Charge, ‘‘Share & Charge is an intermediary
platform’’; it provides intermediary services to enable direct transactions between charging station
owners and EV drivers (Plenter et al., 2018). MotionWerk, the company that operates Share&-
Charge, ‘‘does not offer customers the use of the charging station in their own name, but allows the
operators to offer their customers the use of their charging stations in their own name.’’ In total,
three actors (or legal entities) enter into relations: (i) MotionWerk, the corporation that operates
Share&Charge, (ii) the operators who provide access to the EV charging station, and (iii) the
customers, accessing the charging station and charging their EVs. Share&Charge is not a legal
entity per se; it is a digital interface, working as a digital platform in which offer (operator) and
demand (customer) virtually meet and eventually enter into a (‘‘smart’’) contract
These relations are summarized in Figure 1.
Via the platform, the operator of a charging station may offer access to it for private and
commercial customers. Share&Charge’s interactive map makes it possible for EV owners to find
a charging station in the most suitable location, for instance, at their place of work or where they
live. The operators set a price (tariff) on Share&Charge for their offer. The use of Share&Charge is
free of charge for the customer but operators have to pay a usage fee of 15% of the tariff, which
includes sales tax (value added tax (VAT)), to MotionWerk after the charging process. Charging
tariffs within the charging station network are determined by the operator, but the platform
provides indicative tariffs:
A) Flat rate: tariff at which the customer can charge his electric vehicle irrespective of the load value
and charge state, against payment of a flat rate fixed by the operator.
B) Hourly tariff: tariff at which the customer posts a minute-accurate time quota charged by the
operator, while he can charge his electric vehicle.
Supply of access to EV charging station and supply of electricity  





Figure 1. Relations within Share & Charge.
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C) kWh billing: tariff at which the customer can charge his electric vehicle against payment of a
kilowatt-hour price determined by the operator.3
These tariffs can be illustrated by the following example. We assume that the customer charges
their EV with 40 kWh.
A. Flat rate: single payment of 4.80 Euros for the usage of the charging station, regardless of
the volume of electricity charged, and the hour of the day.
B. Hourly tariff: 0.04 Euros per minute. Assuming that it takes 120 min to charge the EV,
the tariff due is 4.80 Euros.
C. kWh billing: The price is 0.12 Euros/kWh. The customer charges 40 kWh. The tariff due
is 0.12 Euros/kWh  40 kWh ¼ 4.80 Euros.
The terms and conditions of the platform also outline that tariffs ‘‘can be offered by the operator
both as a public tariff for all users of Share & Charge (‘community tariff’), as well as a closed tariff
for users selected by the operator (‘family & friends tariff’).’’ The payment of the charging
operation and the remuneration paid by the operator to MotionWerk are made through an e-
Wallet (Share&Charge wallet). The payment due to MotionWerk from the operator is charged
with the credit that the operator receives from the customer for the charging process.
Two hypotheses, which will be referred to as scenarios 1 and 2, can actually be made with
respect to this model, depending on whether the operator self-produces electricity or not. These are
outlined in Figure 2. For the purpose of this article, the operator is assumed to be an individual.
In both scenarios, interactions with the main utility grid can be observed. In scenario 1, the
operator, who does not self-produce electricity, needs to buy the amount of electricity necessary to
charge the EV on the retail market. Electricity is drawn from the main utility grid and passes to the
EV battery. In scenario 2, we deal with an operator who self-produces electricity but who is not
disconnected from the electricity grid. Hence, under this scenario, the operator will sell electricity
to the customers of Share&Charge as in scenario 1. However, in this case, this electricity will be
either self-produced (if the Photovoltaic [PV] production is sufficient to cover the demand), drawn
from the distribution network (if there is no PV production at this time), or a mix of both (if there is
PV production, but it is not sufficient to cover the demand). In this way, we have two agents: one
that sells electricity to the EVs and another that interacts (or not) with the distribution network.
Benefits
Share&Charge presents certain features that could help in fostering the deployment of e-mobility
and of decentralized electricity production. EVs are one possible response to the environmental
impact of transport. Although the EV market is expanding, several barriers prevent its scale-up.
Numerous studies have emphasized the role of charging infrastructure in the deployment of
e-mobility (Berkeley, Bailey, Jones, & Jarvis, 2017; Steinhilber, Wells, & Thankappan, 2013).
An insufficient number of charging stations appears to be a major barrier to the market diffusion of
3. These are the terms used in the terms and conditions of Share&Charge. However, it can be pointed out that replacing the
terms ‘‘flat rate’’ by ‘‘fixed tariff’’ would be more appropriate; flat tariffs are typically associated with a fixed price per
kilowatt hour, which is not the case here. Similarly, ‘‘kWh billing’’ should be replaced by ‘‘volumetric tariff’’ or
‘‘variable tariff’’ since it depends on the amount of energy (volume of energy) drawn in kilowatt hour.
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EVs, alongside their high acquisition price and their limited autonomy; these represent the primary
sources of consumer anxiety in modifying their preferences (Bakker & Trip, 2013; Graham-Rowe
et al., 2012; Kley, Lerch, & Dallinger, 2011; Sierzchula, Bakker, Maat, & van Wee, 2014; Tate,
Harpster, & Savagian, 2008). A weak charging infrastructure, for example, a lack of charging
`
`
Scenario 1: An individual (operator), who does not produce electricity but who uses Share&Charge. They 
collect revenues for the provision of the EV charging station and for the amount of electricity they draw from 
the grid and sell to the customer through the platform. 
Scenario 2: An individual (operator) who is producing electricity and uses Share&Charge. They collect 
revenue for the provision of their EV charging station and for the amount of electricity they sell. We assume 
PV installations as decentralized electricity production.   
Supply of access to EV charging station and supply of electricity  
Supply of intermediary services
Flow of money1
Supply of electricity












Figure 2. Presentation of the scenarios.
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stations, makes driving an EV less attractive by impeding flexible and convenient use. However, a
more adequate charging infrastructure coverage, through having a larger number of charging
stations and a more optimal infrastructure, for instance, through an increase of fast plug-in charg-
ing stations and appropriate localization planning, requires adequate financing.
The literature has predominantly discussed the role of public authorities to fill the gap of EV
charging infrastructure, leaving aside the potential function of the private sector (for instance, Liu
& Wei, 2018; Hall & Lutsey, 2017; Shao, Taisch, & Ortega-Mier, 2016). Share&Charge enables
charging infrastructure to be financed by individuals and by private companies, as cost is being
recouped from EV drivers through tariffs set for recharging their vehicles. This approach follows
the ‘‘user pays principle,’’ which engages with fair and effective funding. From the perspective of
the operator, using the platform allows them to more rapidly amortize the initial investment
necessary for the installation of a home-based charging station, and subsequently the maintenance
costs of the terminal. Second, the expansion of EVs raises the question of the impact of EV
charging on the electricity grid and on electricity demand (Lopes, Soares, & Almeida, 2011),
especially in heavily populated areas where increased use of EVs will result in much higher
electricity consumption. By increasing the number of charging stations, Share&Charge spreads
electricity demand over a greater number of locations. Where the operator self-produces electricity
(scenario 2), and upon condition that the PV production is sufficient to cover the demand, Share&-
Charge also enables the reduction of problems related to grid overload and energy losses due to
decentralized energy production by enabling electricity storage directly within the EV battery
instead of on the grid, thus establishing local electricity consumption through microgrids. This
further facilitates the expansion of decentralized electricity production and may reduce the needs
for flexibility in the electricity market through a better matching between local energy production
and local demand.
Consequently, models like Share&Charge could positively impact energy and transport policy
by tackling several upcoming obstacles associated with the development of EVs (scenarios 1 and
2) and decentralized renewable energy production capacities (only scenario 2). In particular, such
models could foster the rise of EVs and facilitate the expansion of decentralized renewable
electricity production. However, this innovative solution also creates regulatory challenges.
Part II—Legal framework and disruption: Tax treatment
of Share&Charge
Recent technological advances have enabled the development of new business models based on
platforms which enable the connection of previously unmatched demand- and supply-side market
participants (Ta¨uscher & Laudien, 2018). They facilitate peer-to-peer transactions, assuming a
leading role in the deployment of the so-called sharing or collaborative economy. The Share&-
Charge model takes part in this evolution, by enabling direct transactions between operators of EV
charging station and EV drivers, the platform acting as an intermediary. Nevertheless, as noted by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), digitalization presents
several features that defy current legal frameworks: mobility, reliance on data, network effects, the
spread of multisided business models, a tendency toward monopoly or oligopoly, and volatility
(OECD, 2015, p. 11). In addition, Share&Charge includes other features that disrupt electricity
markets since it is based on decentralized distribution and electricity production (only scenario 2),
facilitating peer-to-peer sales of electricity. As current electricity market regulations were initially
conceived in the context of centralized electricity production, distribution, and transmission, they
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lack provisions to regulate models like Share&Charge or include rules that may place an excessive
burden to their deployment.
The second part of this contribution is dedicated to the challenges that Share&Charge pose to
tax law (see Aslam & Shah, 2017; Beretta, 2017). As law inherently relies on territoriality, it was
necessary to specifically locate the operations. Therefore, for the purpose of this article, oper-
ations are assumed to be performed by Belgian residents in Belgium and the location of man-
agement of MotionWerk, the corporation operating Share&Charge, is also assumed to be in
Belgium. Because Belgium is a federal country with decentralized competences, we assume that
the operator, the customers, and the corporation are all located in the Walloon region. When
necessary, we draw a distinction between scenarios 1 and 2, as defined in the first part of this
contribution. With respect to scenario 2, where electricity is self-produced, we hypothesize that
electricity is generated by means of a ‘‘small PV unit’’ (<10 kVA). As Share&Charge is not
limited to peer-to-peer relations—it also applies to business-to-consumer relations—we analyze
tax rules solely in the hypothesis that the user and the operator are both individuals, because this
model is more innovative and challenging to tax law. More particularly, we explore the inter-
actions of Share&Charge with the following taxes: (1) energy taxes, (2) personal income tax, and
(3) VAT. Energy taxation is understood in a broad meaning, including taxes sensu stricto, but
also other parafiscal levies on energy like fees, tariffs, and so on. Issues regarding corporate
income tax will not be addressed; we will concentrate solely on the relationships between the
operator and the customer.4
Finally, it must be noted that the questions envisaged regarding taxation are more far-reaching
than the Belgian territory and could be applicable in other countries. In addition, they could
provide arguments for further harmonization at an European Union (EU) level.
Energy taxes
When European directives on the liberalization of the electricity market were adopted, electricity
generation, transmission, and distribution were predominantly centralized.5 Electricity was mainly
produced by large generation facilities and then transmitted through a centralized transmission and
distribution grid network to end consumers. This reality has progressively evolved, with the
emergence of decentralized forms of electricity production notably fostered by public policies,
supporting renewable electricity production and, more recently, microgrids. Although renewable
energy has been encouraged by subsequent European legislation, there are actually few provisions
that regulate decentralized electricity production. In that respect, there is, for instance, no com-
monly shared definition between Member States of residential prosumers (GfK Belgium consor-
tium, 2017). Although new directive proposals are timidly creating a framework for renewable
4. The main issues regarding corporate income tax and the digital economy concern tax base erosion and double taxation.
Because the Share&Charge model results in a purely internal situation, it does not raise any problem of erosion of the tax
base or of double taxation. Indeed, the location of management of MotionWerk, the corporation that operates
Share&Charge, is situated in the country of the users of the platform—the operators and the customers—in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the use of the platform. On these questions, see the Proposal for a Council Directive of
March, 21, 2018, on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain
digital services, COM(2018) 148 final; and the Proposal for a Council Directive of March 1, 2018, laying down rules
relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final.
5. See Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 19, 1996, concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal L27, January 30, 1997 P. 20-29.
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electricity self-producers, they are already outpaced by models like Share&Charge which enables
direct sales of electricity between individuals.6 Many domestic legal systems, including those in
Belgium, also appear to have been overtaken by such new market developments.
In Belgium, peer-to-peer sale of electricity remains unregulated; there is no specific legal
provision that determines which rules should apply when one individual sells electricity to
another individual. Based on this background, it is necessary to apply existing rules on this
new model and assess how they can fit into it. In this regard, a major issue is the lack of legal
certainty regarding the qualification of the operators using Share&Charge who provides
access to the EV charging station and subsequently sells the required electricity to charge
an EV: should they be considered an electricity supplier or an end consumer? The Share&-
Charge model obscures the apparently clear distinction between these concepts. Qualifying
the operators is central to this paradox because it determines their applicable rights and
obligations. For instance, energy suppliers are required to obtain an authorization in Belgium,
as is the case in France and in the United Kingdom, to supply electricity to end consumers. In
addition, answering this question is also relevant to determine the person liable for taxes,
tariffs, and levies. This issue of characterization of the operator is addressed in section
‘‘Qualification of the operator’’ of this contribution, while section ‘‘Consequences of the
electricity price structure in setting user tariffs’’ relates to the consequences of the electricity
price structure in setting user tariffs within the Share&Charge model.
Qualification of the operator. An end consumer is defined as ‘‘any individual or legal entity buying
electricity for its own use.’’7 This qualification will give rise to the payment of a number of taxes,
levies, and tariffs. End consumers are taxed for their energy consumption (federal contribution on
electricity and gas, Article 21bis-quarter of the law of April 29, 1999) and for their support to the
cost of a number of public policies and services, such as the financing of offshore windfarms’ grid
connection (Article 7, § 2 of law of April 29, 1999) and of green certificates (Article 7, § 1 of the
law of April 29, 1999). In Belgium, prosumers are assimilated to end consumers; they are not
characterized as electricity suppliers for the electricity they supply to themselves. Prosumers are
legally defined as ‘‘individuals or legal entities producing electricity principally for their own use’’
(Article 2, 2 decree of April 12, 2001). For instance, individuals who produce electricity through
PV panels principally for their own use can be characterized as prosumers. Under both of these
definitions, the idea that electricity is either bought or produced for their own use is central. In
principle, it excludes situations where electricity is directly sold to a third party.8 Based on this
background, the operators using Share&Charge do not fit properly into the concept of end con-
sumers (or prosumer assimilated to an end consumer). Indeed, they sell the electricity necessary to
charge an EV, whether it is self-produced, drawn from the grid, or a mix of both, to a third person:
the customer.
6. See Article 2, (aa) and Article 21 of the Proposal of February 23, 2017, for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, COM(2016) 767 final/2.
7. See, for instance, Article 2, 14, of the federal law of April 29, 1999, on the organization of the electricity market,
Belgian Official Journal of May 11, 1999.
8. As will be further explained (Infra p. 13), owners of small PV installations benefit from financial incentives, which,
notably, take the form of a net metering system. Within this system, the electricity injected into the grid is financially
rewarded. However, in this situation, it is considered that electricity is produced for the producer’s own use.
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The ‘‘electricity distributor,’’ who must be understood as an electricity supplier, is defined as
‘‘the individual or legal entity selling electricity or gas on their account or on behalf of others.’’9
The electricity distributor is the taxable person for the purpose of the energy contribution (Law of
July 22, 199310). The energy contribution is assimilated to an excise, in which the European
framework on excises and the directive on the taxation of energy products apply, as well as the
Belgian domestic law on excise duties.11 It consists of an indirect levy on the making available or
use, in Belgium, of energy products including electricity.12 Based on this background, to the extent
that the operator sells electricity to third persons, they could be qualified as an ‘‘electricity dis-
tributor’’ and, as such, be considered the person liable for the payment of the energy contribution.
In this case, the formalities deriving from the general excise duties system (Law of December 22,
200913) would apply. Of course, this could only be true to the extent where operators are not
characterized as end consumers for the volume of electricity they sell to the customer.
Clearly, current electricity market provisions have not been designed to regulate peer-to-peer
sales of electricity and would require some amendments. Indeed, it seems hard to consider, without
stretching the concepts, the operators of charging stations as end consumers. Therefore, in the
event that these operators are not characterized as end consumers, they would be part of the
electricity supply chain, and the end consumer would be the customer of the operator of a charging
station. Therefore, operators would participate in the cascading system applicable to taxes, tariffs,
and other levies. In addition, these operators would be qualified as electricity suppliers, which
would characterize them as the taxable persons of the energy contribution, and require them to
obtain a license for electricity supply, both in the hypothesis that electricity is drawn from the grid
(scenarios 1 and 2) and self-produced (scenario 2).
The issue of characterizing individuals selling electricity to other individuals has already been
raised in other contexts. First, the Walloon regulatory authority (Cwape)14 has attempted to clarify
the situation of lessors leasing a building on which PV panels were installed. The question was
the following: in the event that a building on which PV panels are installed is rented, who, from the
lessee or the lessor, should be qualified as an electricity producer, where the occupants of the
building are the consumers of electricity generated by the PV unit? Characterization as an elec-
tricity producer was a primary condition to benefit from green certificates, in the sense of the
Walloon decree of April 12, 2001.15 To clarify this problem, the Cwape issued a note setting the
9. Article 424 of the Program law of December 27, 2004, Belgian Official Journal of December 31, 2004.
10. Federal law introducing an energy contribution to safeguard competitiveness and employment, Belgian Official
Journal of July 24, 1993.
11. See notably the Council Directive 2003/96/EC of October 27, 2003, restructuring the community framework for the
taxation of energy products and electricity, Official Journal L283/51 of October 31, 2003; executed by the Program law
of December 27, 2004, Belgian Official Journal of December 31, 2004; and the law of December 22, 2009, on the
general excise duties’ system, Belgian Official Journal of December 31, 2009.
12. Article 1 of the aforementioned law of July 22, 1993.
13. Aforementioned, note 16.
14. The Cwape is the Walloon (regional) regulatory authority. It carries out the general task of monitoring and control and
is entrusted with specific missions with respect to the regional gas and electricity markets. See Article 43, §1st bis of the
Walloon decree of April 12, 2001, on the organization of the regional electricity market, Belgian Official Journal of
May 1, 2001. For more information, see https://www.cwape.be/?%20dir¼1.1, last accessed August, 2, 2018.
15. Belgian Official Journal of May 1, 2012. In particular Article 36. The green certificate system consists of a market-
based mechanism, in which the offer originates from producers of renewable electricity and the demand emerges from
power suppliers who are required to submit a determined number of green certificates (quota obligation) in order to
Vanrykel et al. 9
conditions that need to be fulfilled for an end consumer (the lessee) to be considered an electricity
producer in the specific hypothesis of the letting of immovable property equipped with PV pan-
nels.16 Accordingly, the following elements suggest that the lessor is the electricity producer: the
lessor bears the risks associated with the project and the costs of maintenance, owns the electricity,
and has the right of ‘‘use and enjoyment’’17 of the PV unit. In this case, the lessor supplies
electricity to the lessee and, hence, requires a license. However, when the lease includes the
enjoyment of the PV unit, the lessee is regarded as the electricity producer, not the lessor.
Second, two recent developments also deserve to be mentioned—the first one emerging from
the Cwape and the second from a draft legislation. They concern the issue of qualifying the EV
charging station’s owner(s) from the perspective of authorization of supply. In particular, they
reject the qualification of owner(s) of an EV charging station as an electricity supplier, discharging
them from the requirement of an authorization for electricity supply. On the one hand, the Cwape
has ruled that electricity supply for activities involving rapid plug-in charging stations provided by
petrol/diesel filling stations does not require any authorization.18 Such operations should be char-
acterized as a supply of service (EV charging station), rather than of a supply of goods (electricity);
therefore, they do not necessitate any authorization for electricity supply. This position is condi-
tional upon the requirement that the electricity supplied at the charging station is covered by a
license to supply. In this case, it seems that two hypotheses must be distinguished. In the first case,
the electricity is supplied by an electricity supplier, who is not the owner of the charging station,
and transmitted from the grid to the charging station. The owner(s) of the charging station does not
require any license to supply electricity, as long as the electricity supplier is covered by a license.
By contrast (second hypothesis), if the owner(s) of the charging self-produce the electricity sup-
plied through the charging station, they would need to be covered by a license to supply electricity.
Certain provisions of a draft bill modifying the Walloon decree of April 12, 2001, tend to confirm
the position that public charging points do not require an authorization for electricity supply.19 In
avoid paying a fine. The price is determined by the market but an amount of 65 Euros per certificate is guaranteed. This
system has been replaced by the ‘‘Qualiwatt’’ scheme, which encompassed a premium and net metering; green cer-
tificates still apply when electricity is produced by installations put in operation before March, 1, 2014. Qualiwatt
ended on June 30, 2018.
16. Note CD-13k07-CWaPE of September 12, 2013, on the conditions to fulfill for an end consumer to be considered a
producer in the specific hypothesis of an ordinary lease or a ‘‘all included’’ rental of buildings equipped with PV panels,
accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?%20dir¼3&news¼293, last accessed August, 2, 2018. It complements the
Guidelines CD-13k07-CWaPE of September 12, 2013, on the conditions to fulfill for an end consumer to be considered
a producer.
17. Use and enjoyment are traditional concepts of civil law. The right of use (in latin ‘‘usus’’) refers to the right to use the
good, while the right of enjoyment (in latin ‘‘fructus’’) means the right to collect the income generated by the good. It
applies to the owners, but also lessees and usufructuaries. It must be distinguished from the right to dispose from the
good (‘‘abusus’’), whose only owners benefit.
18. See decision CD-10d13-Cwape of April 13, 2010, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/? dir¼0.2&docid¼134, last
accessed August, 2, 2018; and decision CD-17h11-Cwape of August 10, 2017, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?
dir¼0.2&docid¼3248, last accessed August, 2, 2018.
19. Draft bill of January 1, 2018, modifying the Decree of April 12, 2004, on the electricity market organization for the
deployment of smart meters and flexibility, in particular Article 9, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/?
dir¼4&news¼772, last accessed August, 2, 2018. See also the advice of the Cwape: Advice CD-18c01-CWaPE-1771
of March 2, 2018, on the Draft bill of January 1, 2018, modifying the Decree of April 12, 2004, on the electricity market
organization for the deployment of smart meters and flexibility, in particular p. 19, accessible at https://www.cwape.be/
? dir¼4&news¼772, last accessed August, 2, 2018.
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this context, a public charging point is defined as a charging point that provides nondiscriminatory
access to users of EVs.
Nevertheless, these elements cannot be fully applied to Share&Charge for the purpose of
electricity taxation. First, Cwape is an administrative authority which has no power in tax matters.
The concepts of supply of electricity and of end consumption in tax law are interpreted autono-
mously compared to other fields of law (such as administrative law). Second, the services provided
by Share&Charge could hardly be considered public. Indeed, it appears from the terms and
conditions of the platform that access to charging stations is not public as it requires the consent
of the operator, who is even authorized to provide preferential (discriminatory) tariffs for family
and friends. These uncertainties create an unpredictable regulatory environment for the deploy-
ment of business models like Share&Charge. Moreover, current provisions could impose a heavy
burden on the operators, associated with their possible characterization as an electricity supplier,
that could prevent the furtherance of their activities. As a consequence, it appears necessary to
clarify the current legal framework and to adapt it to models like Share&Charge.
Consequences of the electricity price structure in setting user tariffs. A central issue for the operators
using Share&Charge is to set a price (tariff) for what they offer to be paid by the customer when
charging their EV. Determining appropriate user tariffs is critical because the operator needs to
remain competitive with other operators of EV charging stations within Share&Charge. At the
same time, they should make a profit or at least not lose money. An essential element, when setting
user tariffs, will be the cost of electricity.20 In the electricity market, the price paid for electricity is
composed of the retail electricity price, tariffs, taxes, and other levies. In this second subsection, we
analyze the effect this price structure has on the determination of Share&Charge’s user tariffs, by
distinguishing between scenarios 1 and 2.
Within scenario 1, assuming a volumetric tariff design (the consumers pay per kilowatt hour
drawn from the grid), the electricity costs of the operator are linearly dependent on the amount of
electricity drawn from the grid in kilowatt hour (this amount is multiplied by a retail price in Euros/
kWh, which is assumed constant). This electricity will be used to charge EVs and to meet the
operator’s demand. For instance, take the following hypothesis: assuming an annual demand of
3500 kWh and a retail electricity price to the operator of 0.25 Euros/kWh including VAT, the
operator must pay 875 Euros including VAT. The operator provides the EV charging service three
times per year, 40 kWh each time, totaling 120 kWh. In order to break even, the station operator will
need to charge a minimum of 0.25 Euros/kWh (thus 10 Euros per charging) in a flat-rate electricity
price context. However, if the price of the electricity supplied to the station operator is variable, then
the operator should determine the tariff charged depending on the electricity price in real time. The
operator should be aware of these elements to avoid setting unprofitable prices.
Within scenario 2, taxes, levies, and tariffs will depend on the difference between the amounts
of electricity produced and consumed. Electricity consumed will encompass the demand of the
operator and the demand of the EVs which use the charging station. If there is an excess in total
energy production, the electricity component for the use of the charging station should be any
amount above 0. Indeed, owners of a ‘‘small PV installation’’ (less than 10 kVa) will benefit from
financial incentives, which takes the form of compensation (a net metering system) and of a
20. The tariff asked by the operator also needs to take into account the amortization of the PV unit and of the charging
station but these questions will not be addressed in this article.
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premium21 (Brouhns, 2014; Brouhns, Haverbeke, & Caillol, 2015; Gerkens, 2015). Net metering
consists of a meter that runs forward when drawing electricity from the grid and backward when
injecting electricity into the grid.22 In this system, electricity injected into the grid is valued at the
retail electricity price and excess electricity is not valued (see De Villena, Gautier, Fonteneau, &
Ernst, 2018, p. 3). Taxes, levies, and tariffs are calculated on the basis of the net energy consumed.
Because excess electricity is not valued, the minimal electricity price component only needs to be
set above 0. On the contrary, in the event that difference is negative, namely when electricity
consumed is above electricity produced, the user tariff should be above the price actually paid by
the EV charging station operator for the electricity consumed (electricity price plus tariffs, taxes,
and other levies). In this instance, the situation is similar to scenario 1. Finally, electricity provided
to the customer could also be a mix of self-produced electricity and of electricity drawn from the
grid. Then, both observations apply.
The elements can be illustrated by the following example: The operator has an annual production
of 2000 kWh from its PV unit and benefits from the net metering system. They provide access to the
EV charging station three times during the entire year, each time for 40 kWh (in total 120 kWh).
– If we assume that the operator’s own consumption is 1600 kWh, the difference between
electricity produced (2000 kWh) and electricity consumed (1600þ 120¼ 1720 kWh) is 280
kWh. Therefore, Electricityproduced  Electricityconsumed > 0. In this case, no price has been
paid by the operator for the electricity used to charge the EV, and this excess of electricity
cannot be compensated on the main utility grid. Therefore, the price should be set above 0.
– If we assume that the operator’s own consumption is 2100 kWh as opposed to 1600kWh,
and once more with three 40-kWh EV charges, the difference between electricity pro-
duced (2000 kWh) and electricity consumed (2220 kWh) is 220 kWh. Therefore,
Electricityproduced  Electricityconsumed < 0. In this case, suppose the operator has paid a
price of 0.25 Euros/kWh for the electricity used by the EV charging station customer. As a
consequence, the EV customer tariff for the use of the charging station should be set above
10 Euros (0.25 Euros  40), the break-even point.
– If we assume that the operator’s own consumption is 1900 kWh, the difference between
electricity produced (2000 kWh) and electricity consumed (2020 kWh) is –20 kWh. There-
fore, electricity necessary to charge the EV will be 100 kWh of self-produced electricity and
20 kWh of electricity drawn from the grid. Assuming that the operator had paid a price of
0.25 Euros/kWh for electricity drawn from the grid, the price asked for each use of the
charging station should be set above 1.25 Euros (0.25 Euros  5).
Aside from the difficulties outlined in the case of scenario 1, and which apply to some extent to
scenario 2 (when Electricityproduced  Electricityconsumed < 0), specific difficulties are encountered
in scenario 2. Indeed, two variables need to be considered: the electricity produced and the
electricity consumed. However, both of them can be hard to predict. On the one hand, electricity
production through a PV installation will depend on external factors such as weather conditions,
which can be unpredictable. In addition, the PV unit could encounter technical problems and could
be temporarily out of use. On the other hand, electricity consumption can vary from year to year
21. Or, alternatively, green certificates for installations put in operation before March, 1, 2014.
22. Article 6bis and 24bis Governmental Decree of March 30, 2006, on public services obligations within the electricity
market, Belgian Official Journal of April 24, 2006.
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and will depend on how many customers charge their EV at the operator’s charging station, and
what quantity of electricity they will require. Therefore, it can be difficult for the charging station
operator to determine, at the moment of the EV charging operation, whether the difference
between electricity production and consumption will be positive or negative. This becomes even
more critical when electricity provided to the customers is a mix of self-produced electricity and of
electricity drawn from the grid.
For these reasons, and considering the fact that the operator may likely be an individual who does
not necessarily have specialized knowledge and experience regarding the electricity market, there
could be a case for provision of support services in order to assist the operator in setting appropriate
tariffs. This role could be played by existing actors such as distribution system operators (DSOs) or
regulators. Alternatively, there could be room for a newmarket segment to develop. For instance, the
French DSO Enedis provides a smart (or ‘‘communicating’’) metering system called Linky.23 It
offers several personalized services, based on information received through smart meters, which
encompass advice to adopt wiser consumption behaviors, access to a daily monitoring of electricity
consumption and production, and compares one person’s consumption with that of other clients.24
Such services could be easily extended to assisting users of Share&Charge.
Personal income tax
Share&Charge represents the perfect example of what is known as the ‘‘sharing economy,’’ also
labeled as ‘‘collaborative consumption’’ (Botsman, 2013; Botsman & Rogers, 2010a, 2010b),
‘‘access-based consumption’’ (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Belk, 2014), ‘‘connected consumption’’
(Schor, 2014; Schor & Fitzmaurice, 2015), and a handful of other synonyms (see Codagnone &
Martens, 2016). Although there is no ‘‘shared’’ consensus on how to define the concept and on
which activities it comprises, it is generally accepted that sharing does not necessarily exclude
profit (Botsman, 2013). For example, Meelen and Frenken (2015) understand the sharing economy
as: ‘‘consumers (or firms) granting each other temporary access to their under-utilized physical
assets (‘idle capacity’), possibly for money’’ (see also Codagnone &Martens, 2016). When a price
is received for the access provided, such as in the Share&Charge model, the amount received can
be qualified as an income and, as such, be taxable as personal income.
The operator using Share&Charge, who is assumed to be an individual for the purpose of this
article, generates two types of income: the price received for supply of access to the EV charging
station and price received for the subsequent sale of electricity. With the emergence of the sharing
economy, qualifying items as income appears to be more complex than it used to be. As noted by
the European Commission in its ‘‘European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy,’’ the colla-
borative—or sharing—economy obscures and distorts ‘‘established lines between consumer and
provider, employee and self-employed, or the professional and non-professional provision of
services.’’25 This section outlines the general principles on personal income taxation applicable
in Belgium (see section ‘‘General principles on personal income taxation in Belgium’’), before
applying the concepts of professional income (see section ‘‘Professional income’’) and private
income (see section ‘‘Income from the private sphere’’) to Share&Charge.
23. For more information, see https://www.enedis.fr/linky-communicating-meter, last accessed August 2, 2018.
24. See terms and conditions available at https://espace-client-particuliers.enedis.fr/web/espace-particuliers/cgu-part, last
accessed August 2, 2018.
25. Communication of June 2, 2016, COM(2016) 356 final, p. 2.
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General principles on personal income taxation in Belgium. Until the adoption of the Program Law of
July 1, 2016, income resulting from the sharing economy was taxed just like any other income.26
Belgian tax law distinguishes between four categories of income: professional income, income
from movable property, income from immovable property, and miscellaneous income. Qualifying
the form of income is critical as each income category is governed by its own rules, which allows
for the determination of what is taxable income, its amount, and the deductions that apply. In
addition, it is necessary to determine whether the income resulting from different operations must
be taxed separately, under different categories, or instead should be taxed together, within one
single category.
Income can result from a professional activity or be derived from the private sphere. Income
resulting from a professional activity, even an accessory, is characterized as a professional income.
This is subject to a global progressive taxation. Income from the private sphere can be broken
down into income from movable property, income from immovable property, and miscellaneous
income. Depending on their nature, these will be taxed according to either a flat rate (separate
taxation) or, alternatively, a progressive rate (global taxation). The amount of tax related to income
from immovable property is calculated either on the basis of a fictitious or theoretical income
(cadastral income) or on the basis of real net income. Income from movable property is exhaus-
tively defined by reference to five subcategories, which include income from the hiring out of
movable property. Finally, miscellaneous incomes represent a residual category; income that does
not belong to one of the abovementioned categories falls within the miscellaneous income cate-
gory, which notably comprises occasional profits and benefits. Some types of income are never-
theless considered as being nontaxable as they are derived from the normal management of private
assets. For each category, more-specific criteria have been set forth by various statutes and
regulations, by the courts, and by the tax administration.
Since the entry into force of the Program Law of July 1, 2016, miscellaneous income resulting
from the sharing economy benefits from a preferential tax rate (Afschrift, 2016; Hendricks, 2016;
Marischal & Ickx, 2016). By the adoption of the Program Law of July 1, 2016, the Belgian
legislator has indeed shown willingness to support the development of the sharing economy but
also to catch undeclared income (Afschrift, 2016; Hendricks, 2016; Marischal & Ickx, 2016). The
scope of this favorable scheme is rather narrow as it only applies to benefits and profits resulting
from services (Article 90, 1st lid, 1bis, Income Tax Code (‘‘ITC’’)). Income resulting from the
supply of goods is excluded from the preferential regime. However, these concepts are not defined
in the context of personal income taxation. Although the distinction between supply of goods and
of services is well-established by rules and case law governing VAT, these do not apply to personal
income taxation. This makes it troublesome to determine with certainty the scope of the law. In
addition, the Program Law of July 1, 2016, requires several conditions to be fulfilled such as the
use of an aggregated platform. When the supply of a service also comprises income from movable
property or from immovable property, a breakdown of the income is foreseen (Article 90, lid 3). In
the event that the contract does not contain a distinct price for the supply of a service, it is deemed
to represent 20% of the total performance.
Professional income. Bearing in mind these elements, the first step is to determine whether income
must be considered professional or, alternatively, generated in the private sphere. A professional
26. Belgian Official Journal of July 4, 2016.
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activity supposes a series of sufficiently numerous, repeated, and closely connected operations
(Com.IR 92 n23/35; 90/7.2, 14 Com.IR 92; Cass., May 6, 1969). Criteria such as activity
financing with high levels of credits, whether the activity is the extension of or closely linked
to a professional activity, the number, and the frequency of the operations/transactions and remu-
nerations appear to be decisive in the characterization as professional income (Tiberghien, 2018,
n1096). Professional income is divided into five subcategories, for which additional qualification
is necessary. Characterization as a professional activity will depend on the factual circumstances.
For instance, the Belgian administration (the ruling commission) has considered that income from
a PV unit installed on the roof of a rented building does not qualify as a professional activity, since
the operation of the PV panels does not require intense or regular work (ruling n 2010.317 of
September 7, 2010).
Elements such as access limitation to the platform for a maximal cumulated period and for a
maximal amount of income generated through the platform represent arguments in favor of non-
professional income (ruling n2015.455 of September 29, 2015). Share&Charge’s terms and
conditions, on the contrary, do not contain such provisions. In any event, the qualification will
depend on the factual circumstances applying to each operator, based on the criteria of regularity
and of intensity of the activity. In the case of a professional activity, all the income resulting from
this activity—electricity supply and EV charging station provision—is to be imposed, globally,
according to a progressive tax rate.
Income from the private sphere. If the income is regarded as nonprofessional, it is necessary to
determine in which remaining category it belongs: income from movable property, income from
immovable property, and miscellaneous income. In particular, it is necessary to successively
qualify the income from electricity supply and from an EV charging point provision. Depending
on the interpretation, income resulting from the whole operation—supply of access to the charging
station and sale of electricity—will be taxed globally or separately. Indeed, one could understand
the operations as a pure sale of electricity or value the access to the charging station.
Income resulting from electricity supply produced by a PV unit is regarded as miscellaneous
income under Article 90, 1 ITC (oral questions n 5400 et 5401 of 20May 2008; n 587 of July 15,
2009). Consequently, the supply of electricity by the operator of Share&Charge should logically be
regarded as generating miscellaneous income, and characterization as income from movable (or
immovable) property should be excluded. In this case, income tax should be imposed at a distinct
rate of 33% (Article 171, lid 1, 1 ITC). Nevertheless, these benefits and profits could not be
imposed if they are regarded as resulting from operation falling within the normal management of
private assets.
In the context of electricity production by means of a ‘‘small PV unit,’’ it has been considered
that the sale of self-produced electricity is not regarded as being taxable, provided that electricity
is produced through PV installations that are exclusively used in the private sphere (oral ques-
tions n 5400 et 5401 of 20 May 2008; n 587 of July 15, 2009). This last concept is understood in
the sense that the PV unit has been intended to meet the producer’s own needs (ruling n
2010.317 of September 7, 2010). This position can only be followed if the installation is not
used in the context of a professional activity, even if it is intended to supply the producer’s own
needs. For example, if the PV unit is directly used to provide energy to a building used for
professional purposes, for instance, a pharmacy, income generated by the installation will be
qualified as professional income.
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As noted, in the Share&Charge model, the operator provides access to the charging station and
who then sells electricity to the customer (third party). In our view, this implies that the installation
cannot be considered to have been intended to meet the producer’s own needs and, therefore, that
electricity is not exclusively used in the private sphere. Nevertheless, this condition derives from
administrative practice and interpretation specific to the context of prosumers. It should not be seen
as binding for the purpose of applying personal income tax to models like Share&Charge. Therefore,
on a case-by-case analysis, income from a charging station could still be considered as resulting from
operations falling within the normal management of private assets.27 Another question will be to
determine whether income resulting from electricity supply preferential treatment of Article 90, lid.
1, 1st bis applies to the sharing economy. In our opinion, the answer is negative as the preferential
treatment exclusively applies to supply of services; by contrast, supply of electricity should be
regarded as a supply of goods. However, the income could still be broken down between the supply
of electricity and a possible supply of service, accordingly with Article 90, lid 3.
Since the EV charging station is a physical property, incomes resulting from its use can be
regarded as income resulting from property rental or leasing. Depending on the qualification of
the charging station as a movable or immovable property, the income generated from the sale of
electricity will be qualified as income resulting from a movable (Article 11-19bis ITC) or
immovable property (Article 7-10 ITC). This qualification will have several legal consequences,
notably on the tax rate and on the deductions. One could also argue that the income may be
regarded rather as miscellaneous (occasional profits and services, Article 67, lid 1, 1), with a tax
imposed at the distinct rate of 33%. In such a case, it will be necessary to determine whether the
income has resulted from the normal management of private assets and is, therefore, not subject
to taxation. If not, a subsequent challenge will be to figure out whether the generated income will
be taxed at the preferential rate applicable to services from the sharing economy (Article 90 lid 1,
1bis ITC). Although no general conclusion can be made in this regard as all of these elements
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, income resulting from the use of the EV charging
station within the Share&Charge model should be qualified, in our view, as income resulting
from an immovable property.
VAT
Unlike personal income tax which is calculated based purely on national rules, VAT has been
harmonized at EU level. VAT is a general consumption tax assessed on the added value of goods
and services. It is collected in a fractional way, according to a mechanism that ensures that the tax
remains neutral, regardless of the number of transactions involved. The tax is paid to public
authorities by the supplier of services or goods (the taxable person), who generally has a right
of deduction of the amount of VAT paid to his own suppliers. As a consequence of the deduction
scheme, the amount of the tax is legally and ultimately borne by the final consumer, as part of the
price paid for goods or services. Operations subject to VAT are divided into four categories: the
supply of goods, the supply of services, importation, and intra-community acquisition of goods.
The supply of goods is defined as ‘‘the transfer of a right to dispose of tangible property as an
owner’’ (Article 14 VAT Directive and Article 10 Belgian VAT code), while the supply of a
service is a residuary category that encompasses ‘‘any operation which does not constitute a supply
27. On this issue, see notably Andre (1992).
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of goods’’ (Article 24 VAT Directive and Article 18 Belgian VAT code). For the purpose of VAT
treatment, electricity is assimilated to be a tangible good (Article 15 VAT Directive and Article 9
Belgian VAT code). The taxable person is compelled to fulfill several obligations that can be
burdensome, especially when this person is an individual and whose activity generates modest
value. These include notifying the existence of an economic activity, issuing regular invoices,
keeping regular accounts, and submitting periodic and regular VAT returns.28
To determine the VAT treatment of the transactions, several questions need to be answered:
who (taxable person), what (taxable transaction), where (place of supply), and how much (taxable
amount)?29 In addition, it is necessary to determine whether some exemptions need to be applied.
As underlined by the European Commission, collaborative platforms pose several difficulties in
this regard:
Supplies of goods and services provided by collaborative platforms and through the platforms by their
users are in principle VAT taxable transactions. Problems may arise in respect of the qualification of
participants as taxable persons, particularly regarding the assessment of economic activities carried on,
or the existence of a direct link between the supplies and the remuneration in kind ( . . . ).30
This section focuses on assessing who is the taxable person (see section ‘‘General principles on
personal income taxation in Belgium’’) and what are the taxable transactions (see section ‘‘Pro-
fessional income’’). Because the terms and conditions of Share&Charge require the operator and
the customer to have their place of residence in the country of the registration office of the
corporation operating Share&Charge (MotionWerk), no problem of locating the operations may
arise when using Share&Charge.
The taxable person. According to Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive, a taxable person is anyone
‘‘who independently carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or result
of that activity.’’31 The Share&Charge model raises several issues regarding this definition because
the role of MotionWerk in the supply of the charging station can be interpreted in different ways. In
particular, the key issues are twofold:
1. Who is the taxable person vis-a`-vis activities supplied to the customer: MotionWerk or the
operator?
2. Must the sharing of the charging station and the subsequent sale of electricity be considered
an economic activity?
28. Title VIII of VAT code.
29. See in this regard: ‘‘Supplies of goods and services provided by collaborative platforms and through the platforms by
their users are in principle VAT taxable transactions. Problems may arise in respect of the qualification of participants
as taxable persons, particularly regarding the assessment of economic activities carried on, or the existence of a direct
link between the supplies and the remuneration in kind (for instance in case of ‘bank’ type arrangements where
participants contribute goods or services to a common pool in exchange for the right to benefit from that pool).’’
Communication of June 2, 2016, on the Agenda collaborative economy, COM(2016) 356 final.
30. Communication of June 2, 2016, on the Agenda collaborative economy, aforementioned note 34.
31. In Belgian domestic law, see Article 4, § 1 Belgian VAT code: ‘‘Anyone who independently and regularly carries out
an economic activity of supply of goods or of services as referred to in the present code, as a principal or as a secondary
activity, with or without purpose of profit, and whatever the place of this economic activity.’’
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Agents and commissioners in the context of VAT. To determine who is the taxable person, it is
necessary to assess whether MotionWerk acts in the name and on behalf of the operator (undisclosed
agent) or in their own name (disclosed agent or commissioner). The concept of an intermediary is
actually enshrined in a different set of rules, in particular, the E-commerce Directive (2000/31),32 the
services Directive (2006/12333), and the VAT Directive. Recently, intermediation has been inter-
preted, for the purpose of the E-commerce Directive and of the services Directive by the European
Court of Justice, in two cases involving the platform Uber. Nevertheless, because VAT encompasses
autonomous concepts, one should be cautious when attempting to draw conclusions from these
developments; it is uncertain whether they could be translated to VAT law or not.
In the case 434/15 Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems SpainSL, of December 20, 2017, the European
Court of Justice had to rule about the status of the ridesharing platform Uber. Elite Taxi, Barce-
lona’s licensed taxi association, argued that the UberPop service was unlawful as it was being
operated without the necessary licenses required of private taxi service operators. The central
question of the case was to determine whether Uber was a provider of an information society
service as referred to Article 2(a) of the E-Commerce Directive and as such could operate without a
local license in Spain. An information society service is defined as ‘‘(i) any service normally
provided for remuneration, (ii) at a distance, by electronic means and (iii) at the individual request
of a recipient of services.’’34
The Court found that:
intermediation service provided by Uber is based on the selection of non-professional drivers using
their own vehicle, to whom the company provides an application without which (i) those drivers would
not be led to provide transport services and (ii) persons who wish to make an urban journey would not
use the services provided by those drivers. In addition, Uber exercises decisive influence over the
conditions under which that service is provided by those drivers. On the latter point, it appears, inter
alia, that Uber determines at least the maximum fare by means of the eponymous application, that the
company receives that amount from the client before paying part of it to the non-professional driver of
the vehicle, and that it exercises a certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their
conduct, which can, in some circumstances, result in their exclusion,
concluding that Uber was not a mere intermediation service provider, but rather performed trans-
port services.35 In other words, as stated by Advocate General Szpunar, Uber provides a composite
supply where the supply of transport ‘‘constitutes, from an economic perspective, the main com-
ponent.’’ This wording is reminiscent of the vocabulary used in VAT law. According to van
Cleynenbreugel (2018), two criteria seem to emerge from the Court’s judgment: the creation of
a new market and the exercise of a decisive influence over the conditions of a service offered. This
position was confirmed in the case Uber France (C-320/16), rendered on April 10, 2018.36
32. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000, on certain legal aspects of
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, Official Journal L 178, July 17,
2000.
33. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006 on services in the internal
market, Official Journal L 376, December 27, 2006.
34. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006 on services in the internal
market, Official Journal L 376, December 27, 2006.
35. § 39 of the judgment.
36. E.C.J., Uber France SAS, C-320/16, April 10, 2018.
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In addition, in its communication a European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, the
Commission sets three criteria to assess whether a collaborative platform also provides an under-
lying service: (i) whether the platform sets the final price to be paid by the user or solely recom-
mends it; (ii) whether it sets terms and conditions (other than price) that determine the contractual
relationship between the underlying service providers and the user; and (iii) whether it owns the
key assets used to provide the underlying service. When these criteria are all met, the Commission
considers there
are strong indications that the collaborative platform exercises significant influence or control over the
provider of the underlying service, which may in turn indicate that it should be considered as also
providing the underlying service (in addition to an information society service).37
In VAT law, according to Article 28 of the VAT Directive38 ‘‘[w]here a taxable person acting in
his own name but on behalf of another person takes part in a supply of services, he shall be deemed
to have received and supplied those services himself.’’ To determine whether a taxable person
takes part in the supply of a service provided by another person, as referred to Article 28 VAT
Directive and Article 9 (a) Implementing Regulation 282/2011,39 this person needs to fulfill
several conditions: (i) he must participate in the supply of service, (ii) he must act in his own
name, and (iii) on behalf of another person.40 If these conditions are fulfilled, he will be qualified
as a commissioner. Belgian law has a broader view of the concept of the term commissioner, but
which is not necessarily consistent with European legislation on VAT.41 It sets an irrefragable
presumption42 that intermediaries who receive an invoice from the seller, or who issue an invoice
to the purchaser, in their own name, shall be considered a commissioner (Article 13 Belgian VAT
Code)43:
1. A buying agent is considered to be a buyer and, in respect of his principal, seller of the goods which
are bought by his intermediary; the selling agent is considered to be the seller, and, in respect of his
principal, buyer of the goods which are sold by his intermediary.
2. A commission agent means not only someone who acts in his own name or under a company name
on behalf of his principal, but also the intermediary in the purchase who receives from the seller, or the
intermediary in the sale who delivers to the buyer, on any basis, an invoice, a debit note or any other
writing similarly expressed, in his own name.
In addition, Article 20(1) of the VAT code provides:
37. Communication of June 2, 2016 on the agenda collaborative economy, aforementioned note 34.
38. Council Directive 2006/112/EC of November 28, 2006 on the common system of VAT, Official Journal L 347,
December 11, 2006, p. 1–118.
39. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of VAT, Official Journal L 77, March, 23 2011, p. 1–22.
40. Articles 28 VAT Directive and 9a Implementing Regulation 282/2011.
41. See E.C.J., Belgian State v Pierre Henfling and Others, C-464/10, July 14, 2011.
42. An irrefragable presumption means that it cannot be reversed.
43. See also Article 20, § 1st Belgian VAT code which concerns supply of services.
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. . .where any commission agent or intermediary, acting under the conditions laid down in Article
13(2), takes part in a supply of services, he shall be considered to have received those services himself
and to have supplied those services himself.
Although the terms and conditions of Share&Charge define the platform as an intermediary, it is
necessary to bear in mind the case law of the European Court of Justice according to which
‘‘consideration of economic and commercial realities is a fundamental criterion for the application
of the common system of VAT.’’44In the present situation, concrete elements actually have a case
for each possibility. The fact that the contract for the use of the charging station is concluded
between the operator and the customer represents an argument for considering MotionWerk an
undisclosed agent. On the other hand, the fact that the money received, through digital value units
(‘‘credit balances’’), passes through the Share&Charge Wallet could plead for qualifying Motion-
Werk as a commissioner (disclosed agent). In our view, this last element should not be conferred
too much weight and, therefore, MotionWerk should be qualified as an undisclosed agent.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, we analyze both hypotheses.
If MotionWerk is regarded as an undisclosed agent (Figure 3), operations must be treated
as follows.
The taxable person for the operation of supply of access to the charging station and supply of
electricity is the operator, who is required to issue an invoice. As such, he has the right to deduct
VAT paid on his purchases from the VAT due for the furtherance of his business activity. Within
scenario 2, where electricity is self-produced, input VAT could notably include that paid on the
purchase of the PV installation and that paid on the purchase of electricity. By contrast, within
scenario 1, input VAT will only comprise VAT paid on the purchase of electricity. MotionWerk
provides intermediary operations to the operator, on which VAT is due. In both scenarios, input
VAT paid by the operator on intermediary services supplied by MotionWerk can also be deducted.
By contrast, if MotionWerk is qualified as a commissioner (or disclosed agent) (Figure 4), the
VAT treatment will be as follows.
Price




Figure 3. VAT treatment—MotionWerk is an undisclosed agent.
44. E.C.J., Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs v. Paul Newey, C-653/11, June 20, 2013. See also E.C.J.
Joined Cases C 53/09 and C 55/09 Loyalty Management UK and Baxi Group, October 7, 2010, especially § 39 and 40.
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VAT law creates a legal fiction of two identical supplies of services provided consecutively.
Under that fiction,
the operator, who takes part in the supply of services and who constitutes the commission agent, is
considered to have, firstly, received the services in question from the operator on behalf of whom it
acts, who constitutes the principal, before providing, secondly, those services to the client himself.45
This position has been followed in the Directive 2017/2455, which presumes that the platform is
deemed to have received and supplied the goods itself.46 However, this does not apply to the
present case, since it is limited to cross-border situations (either intra-community sales of goods or
sales of goods from third countries). In casu, electricity supply and the provision of access to the
charging station are performed by MotionWerk for the customer. MotionWerk is regarded as the
taxable person for these operations and issues the invoice to the customer. In this hypothesis, the
operator performs the same transactions of supply of electricity and of access to the charging
station to MotionWerk. The operator is a taxable person for these operations and will issue an
invoice to MotionWerk.
Economic activity. An economic activity within the meaning of the VAT Directive is ‘‘any
activity of producers, traders or persons supplying services’’ (Article 9 (1.)). This concept has
been interpreted broadly by the European Court of Justice (see Beretta, 2018). In particular, there is
an economic activity irrespective of the purpose or result of the activity; the activity does not need
to be profitable to be qualified as economic. Considering this broad definition which includes most
of the sharing economy models, activities of the operator of Share&Charge and of MotionWerk,
who receive a compensation for the performance of their transactions, should be considered
economic activities.
Price
Operations of supply access to EV charging station and supply of electricity
Operator Customer
MotionWerk
Figure 4. VAT treatment—MotionWerk is a commissioner.
45. See E.C.J., Belgian State v Pierre Henfling and Others, aforementioned.
46. Council Directive 2017/2455 of December 5, 2017, amending Directive 2006/112/EC and Directive 2009/132/EC as
regards certain VAT obligations for supplies of services and distance sales of goods, Official Journal L348/7,
December 29, 2017. In particular, Article 2 of the Directive.
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However, in Belgian VAT law, a favorable treatment applies to activities of the sharing econ-
omy, based on the premise that such activities are not economic activities. Under this scheme, the
supply of services performed in the context of the sharing economy is not, upon the respect of
several conditions, subject to VAT, and suppliers of these services are not taxable persons for the
purpose of VAT. This favorable treatment was introduced by the aforementioned law of July 1,
2016, on the taxation of the sharing economy.47 It requires several conditions to be fulfilled,
accordingly with Article 50, § 4 of the Belgian VAT code, and notably the aggregation of the
platform and a maximal turnover of 3255 Euros (to be indexed). The conditions introduced by this
provision are rather fuzzy and even inconsistent with other provisions applicable to the sharing
economy (Hendricks, 2016). As such, they are a source of legal uncertainty. Similar to the rules
applying to personal income taxes, the scheme only applies to individuals who exclusively perform
supply of services. Because the intervention of the operator of Share&Charge includes, as will be
further explained, a supply of goods (electricity supply), it will fall outside the scope of this
favorable scheme.
Finally, it must be noted that suppliers benefiting from this scheme are not entitled to deduct
VAT paid in respect of their acquisitions, because the goods and services used for the operations
are exempt from VAT (Hendricks, 2016). Indeed, deduction of input VAT is linked to the collec-
tion of output VAT. However, in some instance, suppliers might be willing to recover input VAT.
For example, in the case Fuchs (C-219/12), the claimant—Thomas Fuchs—contested the decisions
of the German authorities not authorizing him to deduct input VAT on the basis that his activities
of the operation of a PV unit, installed on the roof of his home and connected the electricity grid,
did not constitute an economic activity. For the anecdote, the European Court of Justice gave a
broad interpretation of the concept and ruled in favor of Mr Fuchs.
Qualification of the transactions. Share&Charge implies the performance of several operations: (i)
supply of electricity, (ii) supply of access to the EV charging station, and (iii) possibly the services
of intermediation (when MotionWerk is considered an undisclosed agent). To determine the VAT
treatment of these operations, it is necessary to assess in which of the four aforementioned
categories each of them falls.48 Electricity supply is regarded as a supply of goods (Article 15
Directive 2006/112 and Article 9 Belgian VAT code), while the supply of access to the station is a
supply of a service (Article 24 and f. Directive 2006/112 and Article 18 Belgian VAT code). Both
transactions are liable to a VAT rate of 21%.
Regarding intermediary services, these are governed by specific provisions (Articles 44, 50, 54,
and 56 of VAT Directive). As a reminder, there will be a supply of services by intermediaries only
in the event that MotionWerk is considered an undisclosed agent. Supply of services by inter-
mediaries is specifically governed by Article 44 of the VAT Directive. Specific provisions apply
with respect to the supply of transport (Article 50 of VAT Directive), supply of cultural and similar
services, ancillary transport services or services relating to movable tangible property (Article 54
of VAT Directive), and the supply of miscellaneous services (Article 56 of VAT Directive). The
services provided by the platform to the operator arguably constitute electronically supplied
services, as referred to Article 56 of the VAT Directive. These are a distinct category of services
(miscellaneous services), which include ‘‘services which are delivered over the Internet or an
47. Infra note 31.
48. The supply of goods, the supply of services, import, and intra-community acquisition of goods (Infra p. 18).
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electronic network and the nature of which renders their supply essentially automated and involv-
ing minimal human intervention, and impossible to ensure in the absence of information technol-
ogy’’ (Article 7(1) of Implementing Regulation 282/2011; see also Article 18, § 2, 16 of Belgian
VAT Code). These encompass website hosting and web page hosting; automated, online, and
distance maintenance of programs; remote systems administration, and so on (Annex II of Imple-
menting Regulation 282/2011). Qualification as electronically supplied services notably has an
influence in determining the place of supply (Article 56 of VAT Directive), in the case of cross-
border transactions. Here, the tax base would be the usage fee paid by the operator to
MotionWerk.49
A second challenge is to assess whether the operations of supply of electricity on the one hand,
and those of supply of access to the charging station on the other hand, must be interpreted as one
single economic transaction, or rather as two distinct operations. Under the first interpretation,
there will be a single, indivisible economic supply for the purpose of VAT—the supply of elec-
tricity—assuming that both transactions are so closely linked that it would be unrealistic to split
them.50 In this case, the price received will be taxed as a supply of goods (electricity), liable at a
rate of 21%. Although this would be in contrast to the decision of the Cwape which has ruled for
the purpose of license requirements that electricity supply for activities involving fast charging
stations provided by filling stations must be qualified as a supply of service, VAT law concepts
benefit from an autonomous interpretation.51
Alternatively, both the supply of electricity and the supply of access to the charging station
could be considered an economic transaction. There will also be a single supply if one or more
elements are to be regarded as constituting the principal supply, while other elements are to be
regarded, by contrast, as one or more ancillary supplies which share the tax treatment of the
principal supply (accessorium sequitur principale).52 In that regard, the European Court of Justice
rules that the ‘‘essential features of the transaction must be ascertained in order to determine
whether the taxable person is supplying the customer, being a typical consumer, with several
distinct principal services or with a single service.’’53 In casu, it is necessary to consider the fact
that under the terms and conditions of Share&Charge, tariffs do not only value the volume of
electricity drawn (‘‘kWh billing’’ or ‘‘volumetric tariffs); instead, they can also be charged irre-
spective of the load value and the charge state (‘‘flat rate’’ or ‘‘fixed tariff’’) or based on a minute-
accurate time quota (‘‘hourly’’). Therefore, they also seem to value access to the charging station.
In our opinion, this represents a strong argument for considering that there is a complex operation
which actually consist of a supply of service rather than a supply of goods. As a consequence, the
price received for the whole supply (supply of electricity and supply of access to the charging
station) would be taxed as a supply of service, liable at a rate of 21%.
49. See Infra p. 4.
50. E.C.J., Meˇsto Zˇamberk, C-18/12, February 21, 2013; E.C.J., Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank, C-41/04, October 27,
2005, especially § 22; E.C.J., Part Service, C 425/06, February 21, 2008, especially § 53; E.C.J., C-497/09, Bog and
Others, especially § 53.
51. Infra p. 10.
52. See, for instance, E.C.J., CPP, C 349/96, February 25, 1999, in particular § 30; E.C.J., Levob Verzekeringen and OV
Bank, aforementioned, § 21; E.C.J., Bog and Others, aforementioned, § 54.
53. E.C.J., CPP, aforementioned, § 29.
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Comparison with the taxation of prosumers. Again, it is interesting to draw a parallel between the
VAT framework applicable to Share&Charge and which applies to prosumers who produce elec-
tricity by means of a ‘‘small PV installation.’’ The sale of electricity and eventually the sale of the
green certificates54 received for the renewable electricity production normally represent taxable
operations under VAT regulation. In order to sell the electricity surplus, it will be necessary to
make use of a double meter with two European Article Numbering (EAN) codes, as opposed to a
simple meter with one EAN code.55 Under VAT law, the sale of electricity and of green certificates
constitutes taxable operations: the sale of electricity is a supply of goods (Article 15 Directive
2006/112 and Article 9 Belgian VAT code), while the sale of green certificates is a supply of a
service (Article 24 and f. Directive 2006/112 and Article 18 Belgian VAT code). However, the
administration and the Minister of Finance (Oral questions n 5400 et 5401 of May 20, 2008; n
587 of July 15, 2009) interpret VAT rules to exempt the sale of electricity produced by a ‘‘small PV
unit’’ from the payment of VAT when the electricity producer is not regarded as a taxable person
for another activity (Decision n114.454 of October 28, 2014).
More particularly, the following distinctions are made (decision n114.454 of October 28,
2014), according to the type of counter used and to the status of the supplier:
 A simple counter or a double counter with one EAN code is used (and therefore electricity
production exceeding electricity consumption cannot be compensated): the electricity
injected into the grid is qualified as a supply of goods, but it is not subject to VAT if the
operator is not already regarded as a taxable person for another activity. The administration
considers that there is no economic activity in the sense of the VAT code. The same
reasoning applies to the commercialization of green certificates. On the contrary, if the
operator is already regarded as a taxable person for another activity, the operations of sale of
electricity and of the commercialization of green certificates will be subject to VAT.
 A double counter with two EAN codes (and therefore electricity production exceeding
electricity consumption can be compensated): the operation of electricity supply will not
be subject to VAT under two conditions: the operator is not already considered as a taxable
person for another activity, and the power of the installation is limited up to 10 kVa (a
‘‘small PV unit’’). If the conditions are not respected, the sale of electricity will be a taxable
operation (supply of goods), subject to the normal VAT rate of 21%. With respect to the
commercialization of green certificates, the operation will always be a taxable supply of
service, imposed at the normal VAT rate of 21%.
Conclusion and policy recommendations
Markets have entered into a digital age. Digitalization impacts most aspects of everyday life,
ranging from commuting, ordering food, to renting an apartment or a car, or just chatting on the
54. See Infra note 20.
55. With a simple meter with one EAN code, electricity produced and electricity consumed are counted by the same meter.
When electricity produced is above 0, excess electricity is not valued. With a double meter with two EAN codes,
electricity produced and electricity consumed are counted separately. In this case, excess electricity can be valued.
However, in practice, small electricity producers do not use such a meter. For more information, see http://www.ef4.be/
fr/pv/cadre-legal/comptage-electricite.html, last accessed August 2, 2018.
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phone. It is admittedly a source of certain abuse, but it is also a factor of progress, which creates
many societal and economic opportunities. Although certain elements of these new models are
certainly innovative, others are actually dated. Sometimes, ‘‘the more things change, the more they
are the same.’’56 Distributed energy production, for instance, is not a new phenomenon; before
electricity production and distribution was centralized, energy was generated and consumed
locally (Jacobs, 2016). In the same way, there is nothing new about sharing. Throughout time,
people have shared goods and services. The real novelty of digitalization is the incredibly rapid
expansion of these markets, thanks to the network effect. Digitalization and platforms have
enabled us to quickly connect previously unmatched demand-side and supply-side market parti-
cipants on a surprisingly large scale.
In this context, the model of the Share&Charge sharing platform which lies at the crossroads
between the electricity market, the transport market, and digitalization provides appealing oppor-
tunities for the deployment of EVs and of decentralized electricity production. The first part of this
contribution has shown the benefits of this model and explained its functioning. However, new
opportunities can create new regulatory challenges. These were presented in the second part. In
particular, the focus has been on challenges in tax matters, assuming that such a scheme as
Share&Charge was introduced into the Belgian market. Based on this background, we would like
to provide several policy recommendations, with a view to creating proper regulation to foster
models like Share&Charge.
First, uncertainties have been observed regarding the legal qualification of several elements, yet
these are essential to accurately assess the tax treatment of operations associated with the use of
Share&Charge. For example, the characterization of the operations performed remains uncertain.
In addition, the qualification of the operator with respect to energy taxes, or of MotionWerk as a
taxable person with regard to VAT, is unclear. The adoption of guidelines at the EU level, or new
amendments to the existing directives could be, we believe, a first step in this direction. However,
with respect to VAT, we would not follow the position taken by Article 2 Directive 2017/2455,
introducing the presumption that the platform is deemed to have received and supplied the goods
itself. In our view, this is not necessarily consistent with the economic reality. It was also noted that
certain concepts, like the supply of goods and of services and intermediary services, occur in
several distinct frameworks. Although these concepts may need to be interpreted autonomously,
one should ensure the consistence of the whole system.
Second, one feature of the sharing economy is that transactions and activities are not necessarily
performed by professionals. Therefore, if participants are treated just as any professional exercis-
ing an economic activity, they may be subject to an excessive administrative burden, which would
risk impeding the furtherance of their activities. Within this context, a number of modifications to
the current legal framework could be considered. For instance, to reduce the administrative burden
associated with the qualification of a VAT-taxable person, platforms could be compelled to issue
invoices in the name of the taxable persons (outsourcing), instead of exempting the operator from
being a taxable person. This proposal would be more respectful of the current legal rules and
definition applicable to VAT treatment. In Belgian domestic law, the legal framework on the
electricity market could be modified, both at the federal and at the regional level, in order to
assimilate the operator in models like Share&Charge to an end consumer, such as the regulations
that have been enacted to regulate prosumers. EU regulation could encourage other member states
56. Epigram of Karr, J.B., ‘‘Les gueˆpes’’: ‘‘Plus c¸a change, plus c’est la meˆme chose.’’
Vanrykel et al. 25
to do so. Furthermore, there is a case for existing actors, such as regulators or DSOs, or for new
actors to play a role in assisting operators to set appropriate tariffs for the provision of electricity.
Third, income generated and operations performed by the operator do not currently benefit from
any financial support. Nor do they benefit from the favorable tax scheme applicable to the sharing
economy, nor from the same advantages as prosumers, without in our view due justification.
Further studies appear to be required in order to assess whether financial support is needed to
foster the development of such a model as Share&Charge. In addition, no distinction is made under
the Share&Charge model according to whether the electricity used to charge a car comes from a
renewable source or not. Another question is whether operators of charging stations should actu-
ally be rewarded by public authorities for providing charging stations, as is sometimes advocated
regarding vehicle-to-grid service provision. This was not the purpose of this article, but we
encourage further research in these matters.
Finally, the Share&Charge model merely involves internal relations within one jurisdiction.
Indeed, the registered head office of MotionWerk is situated in the country of the users of the
platform (the charging station operators and the customers). Many legal questions would arise,
including those of tax base erosion, profit shifting, and of double imposition, if that was not the
case. These issues also deserve due attention among scholars and policymakers.
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